What Has Korea Meant to the United States?

Supporting Questions

1. What did the Republic of Korea mean to the US during the US occupation?
2. How did the relationship between the US and the Republic of Korea change during the Korean conflict?
3. What has the Republic of Korea meant to the US since the Korean conflict?
# Grades 9-12 Korean War Inquiry

## What Has Korea Meant to the United States?

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<th>D2.His.1.9-12. Evaluate how historical events and developments were shaped by unique circumstances of time and place as well as broader historical contexts.</th>
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<td>Staging the Compelling Question</td>
<td>Watch the documentary from the Korean War Legacy Project and take notes about the types of relationships that it highlights. Use these notes to engage in a whole-class conversation about the personal and political relationships that have been forged between Korea and the US since 1945.</td>
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### Supporting Question 1
What did the Republic of Korea mean to the US during the US occupation?

#### Formative Performance Task
List two reasons the US occupied Korea, and cite evidence from the sources to support your reasoning.

#### Featured Sources
- **Source A:** Memo from Dean Acheson to Harry S. Truman, September 14, 1945
- **Source B:** War Department Incoming Classified Message, September 18, 1945
- **Source C:** “The Situation in Korea” (excerpt), Office of Reports and Estimates, January 3, 1947
- **Source D:** Correspondence from George C. Marshall to Kenneth Royall, June 23, 1948
- **Source E:** “The Position of the United States with Respect to Korea” (excerpt), National Security Council Report 8, March 16, 1949

### Supporting Question 2
How did the relationship between the US and the Republic of Korea change during the Korean conflict?

#### Formative Performance Task
Write one to two paragraphs that answer Supporting Question 2 using evidence from the sources.

#### Featured Sources
- **Source A:** “The Truth about Korea,” ca. 1950
- **Source B:** US Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation on Korea, June 26, 1950
- **Source C:** Oral history (excerpt) from Richard Hilton, Korean War Legacy Project (KWLP)
- **Source D:** Oral history (excerpt) from Earl A. House, KWLP
- **Source E:** Summary examining the United States’ role in involving the UN in the Korean War, United States Forces Korea (website)
- **Source F:** Note to staff from Dwight D. Eisenhower on US policy towards Korea post-armistice; January 5, 1954

### Supporting Question 3
What has the Republic of Korea meant to the US since the Korean conflict?

#### Formative Performance Task
Construct a claim using evidence to answer Supporting Question 3.

#### Featured Sources
- **Source A:** “Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of Korea,” October 1, 1953
- **Source B:** Oral history (excerpt) from George H. Campbell, KWLP
- **Source C:** Oral history (excerpt) from former congressional representative Charles Rangel, KWLP
- **Source D:** “Allies for 67 Years, US and South Korea Split Over North Korea,” *New York Times*, September 4, 2017

### Summative Performance Task
**ARGUMENT** What has Korea meant to the United States? Construct an argument (e.g., detailed outline, poster, or essay) that discusses the compelling question using specific claims and relevant evidence from historical and contemporary sources while acknowledging competing views.

**EXTENSION** Develop an annotated timeline that charts the relationship between the Republic of Korea and the United States since 1945.

### Taking Informed Action
**UNDERSTAND** Research how many US troops and military bases are on the Korean peninsula today and the current issues that challenge the US-Republic of Korea alliance.

**ASSESS** Write a list of pros and cons concerning US military presence in the Republic of Korea, noting whether this ongoing relationship remains worthwhile for both countries.

**ACT** Create a position statement arguing for or against keeping US troops in the Republic of Korea and post the statement to the Asia Unbound blog, which is part of the Council on Foreign Relations Network.
Overview

Inquiry Description

This inquiry leads students through an investigation into the relationship between the United States and the Republic of Korea. By investigating the compelling question about the what Korea means to the United States, students will have to consider the ways in which government documents and oral histories provide a unique way to understand this strategic relationship and make a claim on the significance of the Korean peninsula to the United States military.

NOTE: This inquiry is expected to take four to seven 55-minute class periods. The inquiry time frame could expand if teachers think their students need additional instructional experiences (i.e., supporting questions, formative tasks, sources). Inquiries are not scripts, and teachers are encouraged to modify and adapt them in order to meet the requirements and interests of their particular students. Resources can also be modified as necessary to meet individualize education plans (IEPs) or Section 504 plans for students with disabilities.

Structure of the Inquiry

In addressing the compelling question, “What has Korea meant to the United States?,” students will work through a series of supporting questions, performance tasks, and sources in order to construct an argument with evidence and counterevidence from a variety of sources.

Staging the Compelling Question

To begin this inquiry, students watch a documentary from the Korean War Legacy Project. The focus of the documentary is a Korean War veteran revisiting Korea with his grandson. As students view the video, they should be prompted to take notes on the types of relationships highlighted in the documentary. After the video, students will use these notes to engage in a whole-class conversation about the personal and political relationships that have been forged between the Republic of Korea and the United States since 1945.

Supporting Question 1

The first supporting question “What did Korea mean to the United States during the US occupation?,” helps students establish a foundational knowledge of the United States' purpose in Korea after the Japanese had been defeated and WWII ended. The formative performance task calls on students to use primary source documents to list the two main reasons behind the US occupation of Korea, and give evidence to support each reason. The featured sources for this supporting question are a collection of government documents and correspondence from the Truman administration; these are sequenced chronologically. Featured Source A is a 1945 memo from State Department Undersecretary Dean Acheson to President Harry S. Truman. Acheson’s memo details the situation in the Republic of Korea (South Korea) and includes as an attachment a recommended statement for Truman to make based on Acheson’s understanding of the situation. Featured Source B is a then-classified War Department
message from 1947 explaining the situation on the Korean peninsula. Featured Source C is a 1947 report on the situation in the Republic of Korea and the development of a self-sufficient government by US occupying forces. Featured Source D is a letter sent in 1948 from the Secretary of State G. C. Marshall to the Secretary of the Army Kenneth Royall. The letter underlies the US decision to begin to pull forces out of Korea. Teachers will want students to dwell in the space this document creates as they work to answer, “How does the fact the US was pulling out troops in 1948 answer what Korea meant to the US?” Featured Source E is a declassified CIA argument from 1949 that highlights the situation in Korea as well as an assessment of the progress that has been made under the watch of the US government.

Supporting Question 2

For the second supporting question “How did the relationship between the US and the Republic of Korea change during the Korean conflict?,” students build on their understanding of Korea’s importance to the United States government by analyzing key government correspondence as well as oral histories from Korean War veterans. Students will work to synthesize the information from the featured sources and write one to two paragraphs that answer this supporting question. Featured Source A is a government paper (circa 1950), “The Truth about Korea,” which is a plea for bipartisan action at the domestic level, and restates the meaning and importance of Korea to the United States on an international level. Featured Source B is a memorandum of conversation between President Truman, State Department officials, and US military leadership detailing a conversation about the “Korean Situation” after the Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea (North Korea) invaded the Republic of Korea (South Korea). Featured Sources C and D are oral history excerpts from two veterans who recount what the relationship between the United States and the Republic of Korea meant during the conflict. Featured Source E is a summary of the United Nations Command’s service in the Korean Conflict. Students should be encouraged to think about the role the United States played in getting the United Nations involved, as well as the amount of support the United States gave as a member of the United Nations. Featured Source F is a memorandum from President Eisenhower to staff members detailing the United States’ continued commitment to the Republic of Korea even after the armistice that ended the war was signed.

Supporting Question 3

Having examined the relationship between the Republic of Korea and the United States after WWII as well as during the Korean War, students will now be asked to answer the supporting question, “What has the Republic of Korea meant to the United States since the Korean conflict?” The formative task asks students to answer the supporting question by drawing on the featured sources to build and support a claim. Featured Source A is the mutual defense treaty signed by the United States and the Republic of Korea on October 1, 1953; this formal agreement details the military relationship between the two nations after the Korean War. Featured Sources B and C are excerpts of oral histories from two veterans of the Korean War. In each, the veterans describe the importance of the relationship between the Republic of Korea and the United States. Teachers will want to point out that the veteran in Featured Source C is former congressman Charles Rangel from New York. Featured Source D is a New York Times article describing the strong relationship that has existed between the United Stated and the Republic of Korea for the last 67 years, and how rising tension with North Korea is complicating this longstanding alliance.
Summative Performance Task

In this task, students construct an evidence-based argument using multiple sources to answer the compelling question, "What has Korea meant to the United States?" Students' arguments could take a variety of forms, including a detailed outline, poster, or essay.

Students' arguments will vary, but could include any of the following:

- The meaning of the relationship between the United States and Korea has evolved over the last 80 years. Though initially about removing Japanese imperialism and reunifying the country, the relationship changed to be more about limiting the spread of communism, and later to preventing war on the peninsula.
- The relationship between the United States and Korea has been about stabilizing, but not reunifying, the peninsula. Though there were initial efforts to reunify North and South Korea, the relationship has more recently revolved around preventing communism and armed conflict from engulfing the region.
- The relationship between the United States and Korea has been mostly about protecting South Korea from outside influences. The US military's involvement has centered around eliminating outside threats (e.g., Japanese imperialism and communism) in order to facilitate the establishment of a democratic government and ensuring economic security.

Students could extend the arguments by developing an annotated timeline charting the relationship between the Republic of Korea and the United States since 1945. Teachers will want to make sure that students not only chart the primary source documents that are the basis of this inquiry, but also examine important events that took place during the Korean War. The Korean War Legacy Project website provides valuable additional sources to examine as students develop their annotated timelines.

Students have the opportunity to Take Informed Action by examining what Korea means to the United States today. To understand, students can research how many US military personnel and bases are on the Korean peninsula today and the current issues that challenge the alliance between the two countries. To assess the issue, students could write a list of pros and cons concerning the US military presence in the Republic of Korea, noting whether the ongoing relationship between the United States and the Republic of Korea remains worthwhile for both countries. To act, students could create a position statement arguing for or against keeping US troops in the Republic of Korea, and then post their statements on the Asia Unbound blog maintained by the Council on Foreign Relations that examines the United States’ involvement in Asia.
Staging the Compelling Question

**Featured Source**


Used with permission from the Korean War Legacy Project
Supporting Question 1

| Featured Source | Source A: Memo from Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson to President Harry S. Truman, with suggested public statement clarifying the United States’ intentions specifically regarding Japanese officials stationed in Korea upon the Armed Forces occupation of the Korean capital, September 14, 1945 |

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Department of State
Washington

September 14, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Proposed Statement on Korea

Upon the occupation of the capital of Korea on September 9, 1945, by the American Forces, the American Commander stated that Japanese officials would be temporarily retained at their posts, but subsequently it was announced that they would be removed as rapidly as possible. In the meantime a directive has been dispatched by the Joint Chiefs of Staff lacking the immediate removal of the Japanese Governor-General and other high officials. A report of the action taken pursuant to the directive is expected at any time.

There has been a very unfavorable reaction both in Korea and in the United States to the original announcement by the American Commander regarding the temporary retention of Japanese officials.

In view of the misunderstandings and unfavorable publicity which have arisen, it is believed that it would be desirable that you issue a public statement reiterating and clarifying the intentions of the American Government in regard to the policies of this Government toward Korea. A draft of a statement, which you may wish to consider for issuance at your early convenience, is attached.

Enclosure:

Draft statement.
STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

Draft

The surrender of the Japanese forces in Seoul, ancient Korean capital, heralds the liberation of a freedom-loving and heroic people. Despite their long and cruel subjection under the warlords of Japan, the Koreans have kept alive their devotion to national liberty and to their proud cultural heritage. This subjection has now ended. The Japanese warlords are being removed. Such Japanese as may be temporarily retained are being utilized as servants of the Korean people and of our occupying forces only because they are deemed essential by reason of their technical qualifications.

In this moment of liberation we are mindful of the difficult tasks which lie ahead. The building of a great nation has now begun with the assistance of the United States, China, Great Britain and the Soviet Union, who agree that Korea shall become free and independent.

The assumption by the Koreans themselves of the responsibilities and functions of a free and independent nation and the elimination of all vestiges of Japanese control over Korean economic and political life will of necessity require time and patience. The goal is in view but its speedy attainment will require the joint efforts of the Korean people and of the allies.

The
Supporting Question 1

**Featured Source**

**Source B:** War Department Incoming Classified Message describing “the general situation” in South Korea as “a powder keg ready to explode,” September 18, 1945

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**WAR DEPARTMENT CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER**

**INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE**

**OPERATIONAL PRIORITY**

From: Commander in Chief Army Forces Advance Tokyo Japan

To: War Department

No: GAX 52058

18 September 1945

Passed GAX 52058. TDP SECRET.

Following is a summary to include 17th September of reports received in this headquarters from the Office of the Commanding General XXIV Corps in Korea.

1. General. The general situation in southern Korea at present is compared to a powder keg ready to explode upon application of a spark. The splitting of Korea into two parts for occupation by forces of nations operating under widely divergent policies and with no common command in an impossible situation. The occupation of Chemulpo and Seoul proceeded without significant incident. Receiving orders from Tokyo, Japanese in southern Korea have surrendered and appear thus far as cooperative. However, where they are to the south of United States Forces the Japanese are understood to be looting and intimidating the Koreans, who hate the Japanese with a bitterness unbelievable and would wreak dire vengeance on all Japs, civilians and soldiers alike, were United States Forces not present. Since surrender was announced on 15th August, the Koreans have been on a prolonged holiday, not showing any interest in normal pursuits.

2. Removal of Japanese officials. The problem of government of Korea will be complicated and difficult for some period of time. Thirty years of a highly concentrated administration completely dominated by the Japanese throughout ON-TH-4876 (19 Sep 45)

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OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

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From: Commander in Chief Army Forces Advance
Tokyo Japan

Mr: OAX 52058 18 September 1945

the important offices and Civil Service have left no Korean qualified personnel except in minor provincial and city jobs. Removal of the Governor-General, the Police Commissioner, Bureau Chiefs and some other high officials caused a favorable reaction among Koreans. However, wide scale removal of Japanese at this juncture with no acceptable Koreans, and a limited Military Government personnel cannot be accomplished practically. Some Japanese will of necessity have to be retained as advisors for our direct Military Government.

3. Russian Activity. Based on reports of persons interviewed and eye witness accounts of result, the Russians have vandalized, pillaged and looted indiscriminately areas south of 36 degrees where they have visited.

Infrequent crossing below the 38 degrees have been made otherwise the line has been respected. Political agents have, left their thoughts throughout our area and political agitators have begun parades, demonstrations and other propaganda to disrupt our work and to discredit the United States before Koreans. The Russian Consul has been contacted at Keijo and a liaison party has been established at the Russian Headquarters at Keijo. The Soviet Consul-General, who had never left the territory to be ours, was invited to surrender ceremonies but he declined to attend although he called some few days later. Tactical liaison has been completely established between United States and Soviet Forces. Amicable but unproductive staff discussions of political and economic problems caused by separation of this closely

CM-IN-14876 (19 Sep 45)

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OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

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From: Commander in Chief Army Forces Advance
Tokyo Japan

Mr: CAX 52058 18 September 1945

It is believed that instructions are awaited by Russian military authorities.

4. Political parties. The Koreans themselves have for so long a time been downtrodden that they cannot now or in the immediate future have a rational acceptance of this situation and its responsibilities. There has been a misconception also as to how immediate their independence is to be and as to how quickly the Japs will be thrown out. Already political parties with so called leaders are being born in emotion. Some are Communist and others support the Chungking Provisional Government. G-2 is investigating many political parties which have recently mushroomed. However, manifestations indicate the possible desirability of bringing in the Provisional Government and such persons as Kin Koo and Syngman Rhee and others of his groups. Some older and more educated Koreans despite being now suspected of collaboration are conservatives and may develop into quite useful groups.

5. Paragrapa. The XXIV Corps is small in strength and short of competent staff and Military Government personnel which forces operations in limited areas and hence with little overall effect. Necessity for expanding throughout all Provinces in our area is urgent. The American troops have not yet been required to fire a shot or to injure an inhabitant and they have restored and maintained order wherever they have gone: both facts are significant of their prestige.

6. Monetary matters. The Korean Monetary System has been thoroughly sabotaged and it will be impossible to

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From: Commander in Chief Army Forces Advance Tokyo Japan

Mr: OAX 52058 18 September 1945

enforce the pegging of prices at the 15th August levels.

Threatened by bank runs, the Japanese have issued several billions of yen of newly printed Bank of Chosen notes in the last few weeks resulting in the skyrocketing of wages and prices and a thriving black market. United States Forces have been ordered to refrain from all local purchases without permit but only the introduction of a complete new Monetary System can reestablish fiscal controls.

7. Foodstuff. Although there is a fairly adequate storehouse supply of foodstuffs, distribution and rationing have broken down badly and successful reinstatement is not likely. Disruption of railways and lack of motor transport impairs movement of foodstuffs. All assistance is being given in rehabilitating Jap Army transport, but railway situation most serious with only ten days fuel supply available, South Korean mines not producing and negotiations not concluded to obtain coal from North Korean mines in Russian Zone.

8. Industries. Hundreds of thousands are unemployed by collapse of war industries and strikes are threatened in railways and public utilities. A general work holiday is being staged by many identifying independence with freedom from work despite propaganda emphasis to stay on job and rebuild for Koreans. A situation ripe for agitation has developed and being further aggravated by the lack of raw material and the location of coal and primary power sources in the Russian Zone.

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From: Commander in Chief Army Forces Advance
Tokyo Japan

To: OAX 56098
18 September 1945

9. Demobilization. Nothing approaching stable conditions in Korea can be established until the Japanese Army and most of the Japanese population have been removed to Japan. Demobilization of the Japanese Army in Korea is absolutely impossible. It will have to be kept in forced bodies and removed to Japan beginning as soon as its disarmament is complete. It will be a source of irritation as long as it is in Korea. It cannot be controlled here unless taken over and put in guarded cages where we have to feed, house and care for them. Ferries are now operating from Fusen to Kyushu capable of transporting about 6,000 to 7,000 individuals per day. They are carrying Japanese to Japan and Koreans to Korea at about equal rate. It is believed that these should be continued since nationals of the two nations are piling up in the ports on each side of the channel trying to get home and the exchange does not affect the balance of individuals to be fed and housed but does reduce the capacity in each area for making trouble. However, it would greatly assist the occupation to transport the Japanese Army home at an early date, supervising this move at the port.

10. The press. The newspaper correspondents covering Korea as a group have behaved badly. They arrived by air after our landing, most of them from Japan with no knowledge of the local situation and without orientation took advantage of the American uniform to run rampant over the area, committing acts of personal misbehavior that troops have been forbidden to do. There is reason to believe that by open sympathies with Korean radicals some of them have induced Korean group leaders to greater efforts at agitation for overthrow of everything and to have the Koreans take over.

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Supporting Question 1

| Featured Source | Source: Central Intelligence Group report, “The Situation in Korea” (excerpt), Office of Reports and Estimates 5, January 3, 1947 |

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**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP**

**THE SITUATION IN KOREA**

ORE 5/1

3 January 1947

COPY NO. 1
Central Intelligence Group

The Situation in Korea

SUMMARY

Unity and independence are the dominant aspirations of the Korean people, while partition and joint occupation by the US and USSR are the governing factors in the political and economic life of the peninsula. The promises of independence made at Cairo, and confirmed at Yalta, have not been fulfilled. The division of Korea at the 38th parallel has become an almost impenetrable barrier between the US and Soviet Zones. The Moscow Decision, which provides for the unification and eventual independence of Korea, has not been implemented, largely because of disagreement between the US and USSR over the interpretation of the document and the meaning of democracy. All efforts to reconvene the Joint Commission since its adjournment last May have failed.

In the current deadlock, both the US and USSR are attempting to strengthen the political and economic organization of their own zones. The USSR has made more rapid progress toward regimentation in North Korea than the US has made toward democracy in its zone. An interim US policy for South Korea was not implemented until after the adjournment of the Joint Commission disclosed the fundamental disagreement over interpretation of the Moscow Decision. The sovietization of North Korea, on the other hand, began immediately after the occupation, and has proceeded without interruption since then.

Soviet policy in Korea is directed toward the establishment of a friendly state which will never serve as a base of attack upon the USSR. In order to attain this objective at a minimum cost to its own scanty resources in the Far East, the USSR has attempted to make North Korea economically self-sufficient though politically subordinate. Soviets have given their zone a semblance of autonomy by entrusting the administration to a hierarchy of “people’s committees” dominated by the Korean Communists. The economy of North Korea has also been reconstructed on the principle of state control. Banking, heavy industry and communications have all been nationalized. The land has been redistributed, and private enterprise survives chiefly in agriculture and handicrafts. Membership is compulsory in a monoplastic system of unions under strict political supervision.


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June 23, 1948

Dear Mr. Secretary:

It will be recalled that on April 6, 1948, the President approved the Conclusions of National Security Council paper No. 8 on The Position of the United States with Respect to Korea, and directed that they be implemented by all appropriate Executive Departments and Agencies of this Government under my coordination.

It is my understanding that the Department of the Army, in accordance with the foregoing directive, has authorized the initiation of preparations for the withdrawal of occupation forces from Korea, and that, for planning purposes, August 15, 1948 has been set as the date on which actual troop withdrawal will commence. These preparatory measures would appear to be entirely consistent with the provision of the National Security Council paper that "every effort should be made to create conditions for the withdrawal of occupation forces by 31 December 1948."

In the light of the present world political situation, however, and of the inescapable effect which our actions in Korea will have upon that situation, it is of particular importance that withdrawal should be "phased in consonance with the accomplishment of the objectives outlined in that paper and with the relevant commitments of the U.S. vis-a-vis the UN." While every effort should be made to bring about the withdrawal of our occupation forces from Korea by the end of the current year as presently contemplated, sufficient flexibility should be maintained in the preparation and execution of withdrawal plans to make possible changes in the implementation of such plans which UN action or other developments may make advisable.

I assume, therefore, that the plans of the Department of the Army for withdrawal of our occupation forces from Korea, and particularly before initiation of actual withdrawal, are adaptable to changes which may be necessary to correlate with developments contemplated in the National Security Council paper. Assistant Secretary Calzona will act as my representative in connection with the implementation of the National Security Council paper.

Faithfully yours,

C. G. Marshall

The Honorable
Kenneth C. Royall,
Secretary of the Army.
REPORT BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ON

THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT TO KOREA

THE PROBLEM

1. To re-assess and re-appraise the position of the U. S. with respect to Korea as defined in NSC 8 of April 2, 1948, in the light of developments since the adoption of that position.

ANALYSIS

2. a. Objectives of U. S. policy in Korea as defined by NSC 8:

   (1) The broad objectives of U. S. policy with respect to Korea are:

      (a) to establish a united, self-governing, and sovereign Korea as soon as possible, independent of foreign control and eligible for membership in the UN;

      (b) to ensure that the government so established shall be fully representative of the freely expressed will of the Korean people;

      (c) to assist the Korean people in establishing a sound economy and educational system as essential bases of an independent and democratic state.

   A more immediate objective is the withdrawal of
CONCLUSIONS

3. It is concluded that:

a. The broad objectives of the U. S. with respect to Korea should continue to be those set forth in paragraph 2-a above.

b. In pursuance of those objectives the U. S. should continue to give political support and economic, technical, military, and other assistance to the Government of the Republic of Korea.

c. Preparation should be made for the withdrawal of remaining U. S. occupation forces from Korea, such withdrawal to be completed on or about June 30, 1949, subject to consultation with the UN Commission on Korea and the Korean Government and assuming the completion by that date of the transfer of military equipment and supplies in accordance with paragraph 3-d below.

d. Prior to the final withdrawal of such U. S. forces there should be transferred to the Government of the Republic of Korea for its security forces at least a six-months stockpile of military equipment and supplies, with combat reserve, based on a Korean Army strength of 65,000 men.

e. There should be established in Korea forthwith a U. S. military advisory group, already in existence on a provisional basis, which will be responsible for the effective training of the Korean Army, coast guard (Navy), and Police, and for the effective utilization of U. S. military assistance by these forces.
f. Legislative authorization should be sought for continuing military assistance to the Government of the Republic of Korea for FY 1950, and thereafter subject to developments, designed to provide that government with:

   (1) a well-trained and equipped Army of at least 65,000 men, capable of maintaining internal order under conditions of political strife and inspired disorder and of assuring border security;

   (2) a well-trained and equipped coast guard (Navy) capable of assuring to a reasonable degree the security of the port facilities and coast lines of South Korea;

   (3) a well-trained and equipped police force capable of performing the normal police functions of law enforcement and of cooperating when necessary with the Army in the preservation of public order.

g. Legislative authorization should also be sought for the presently contemplated ECA program for Korea for FY 1950 end, subject to annual review in the light of developments, for the continuance of economic and technical assistance to Korea beyond FY 1950.

h. An effort should be made to increase the effectiveness of the informational, cultural, educational, and exchange of persons programs in Korea in accordance with the peculiar requirements of the situation existing in that country.

i. All phases of U. S. Government activity in Korea should be unified in a combined American Mission in Korea under the over-all direction of the American Ambassador.
i. The U. S. should seek to promote sympathetic interest and participation in the Korean problem and support of the Government of the Republic of Korea by the UN and by its individual member states, and should continue to cooperate with the UN in the solution of that problem. In particular, the U. S. should lend all appropriate support to the efforts of the UN Commission on Korea established under the GA Resolution of December 12 in its efforts to help the Korean people and their lawful Government to achieve the goal of a free and united Korea.

k. In publicly announcing the withdrawal of its remaining occupation forces from Korea, the U. S. should make it unmistakably clear that this step in no way constitutes a lessening of U. S. support of the Government of the Republic of Korea, but constitutes rather another step toward the regularization by the U. S. of its relations with that Government and a fulfillment on the part of the U. S. of the relevant provision of the GA Resolution of December 12, 1948.
Supporting Question 2

**Featured Source**

**Source A: Unknown author, “The Truth about Korea,” ca. 1950**

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**FOREWORD**

The unprovoked aggression by the Soviet dominated government of North Korea against the Republic of Korea has created widespread interest in recent relations of the United States with Korea. There have been full accounts of U.S.-Korean relations published recently by the Department of State and Congressional committees. In order, however, that the most significant facts may be readily available, they are set out in this pamphlet.

President Truman, the Democratic Party and the Democratic leadership and membership in the Senate and House of Representatives believe firmly that foreign affairs should be conducted on a bipartisan or non-partisan basis. That is undoubtedly the belief of a farsighted but comparatively small group in the Republican party and in the Republican membership in the Senate and House. Full tribute is paid here and now to the wisdom and patriotism of these men and women.

There can be no question, however, that the leadership of the Republican party and its leadership and the majority of its membership in the Senate and House, motivated by isolationism and pure partisanship, have endeavored in many cases to obstruct the adoption of foreign policy measures vital to the welfare of the country which have been advanced by the Administration and in fact supported on a bipartisan basis by farsighted Republicans.

These Republican leaders in the party and the Congress are now engaged in a frenzied effort to hide their guilt for obstructing the efforts of the Administration to strengthen the Republic of Korea and the free world. They are brazenly propagating false and distorted accounts of certain aspects of U.S.-Korean relations. These matters are dealt with particularly to make certain the truth is known.
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF KOREA

Korea is a mountainous peninsula slightly larger than New England, New Jersey and Maryland combined. It has a total population of about 30 million. The Republic of Korea south of the 38th parallel embraces about half of the land area and 20 million of the people. Korea had been annexed by Japan in 1910 and remained a Japanese colony until liberated at the end of World War II.

The significance of Korea cannot be measured in terms of its relatively small area and population. In the great world struggle in which the United States and other free nations are resisting the determined efforts of the Soviet imperialism to dominate the world, the success of American efforts to help the people of Korea build a free nation is of immeasurable importance. As President Truman said in proposing the "little BCA" for Korea to the Congress on June 7, 1949:

"Korea has become a testing ground in which the validity and practical value of the ideals and principles of democracy which the Republic is putting into practice are being matched against the practices of communism which have been imposed on the people of North Korea. The survival and progress of the Republic toward a self-supporting, stable economy will have an immense and far-reaching influence on the people of Asia. Moreover, the Korean Republic, by demonstrating the success and tenacity of democracy in resisting communism, will stand as a beacon of the people of northern Asia in resisting the control of communist forces which have overrun them.

"If we are faithful to our ideals and mindful of our interests in establishing peaceful and prosperous conditions in the world, we will not fail to provide the aid which is so essential to Korea at this critical time."

Background of Policy

The question of policy toward Korea was first discussed by the Allies during the war at the Cairo Conference of December 1943. At that time, the United States, the United Kingdom, and China were looking for means to create dissension within the Japanese Empire and help split it up. They also had in mind the long-range purposes of the war against Japan.

They recognized the enslavement of the people of Korea and stated their determination that "in due course Korea shall become free and independent."

Later on at Potsdam they agreed that the terms of the Cairo declaration should be carried out. When Soviet Russia declared war on Japan on August 8, 1945, it also joined in the Potsdam declaration and thus committed itself to the freedom and independence of Korea.
Among the many oft-repeated falsehoods about the partition of Korea, the most important is that the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to the division of Korea along the 38th parallel. This is simply not true. The decision to divide Korea into two parts was made unilaterally by the United States and the Soviet Union, and not as a result of a mutual agreement.

The 38th parallel was chosen because it was the approximate midpoint of Korea. The United States and the Soviet Union each agreed to occupy half of the country, with the United States occupying the southern half and the Soviet Union occupying the northern half. This decision was made in 1945, at the end of World War II, as part of the Potsdam Agreement, which ended the war against Japan.

It is important to note that this decision was made unilaterally by the United States and the Soviet Union, and not as a result of a mutual agreement. The decision was made in the context of the post-war division of Korea, which was ultimately determined by the United States and the Soviet Union.
United States Efforts to Unite Korea

It should, of course, be thoroughly understood that the division of Korea and the movement of United States forces into Korea was never intended to be for a long-term occupation. This was a development which resulted from the persistent refusal of the USSR to agree to the establishment of a united and independent Korea upon terms which would do justice to the aspirations of the Korean people for freedom and national independence.

At the Cairo Conference, in December 1943, the United States, Great Britain, and China had declared that, after Japan had been defeated, all Korea would become a single Republic. This was reaffirmed at the Potsdam Conference, in July 1945. The Soviets joined in that pledge. From the first days after the acceptance of Japanese surrender, the United States endeavored to obtain agreement of fulfillment by the USSR of its pledge. The Soviets on their part refused to deal with any non-Communist Korean groups and rejected every reasonable proposal advanced. At the same time, they launched an ever-increasing campaign of anti-American propaganda and vilification and commenced to create Communist controlled military forces in North Korea. In view of this stalemate, it was concluded that the justified desire of the Korean people for independence and unity entitled them to have the aid of the world community in getting it. Therefore, the United States took the Korean problem to the United Nations in November of 1947, asking that Korea be established as a unified nation through election of a provisional government which would draw up a constitution. The Korean issue was handled before the General Assembly by Mr. John Foster Dulles, a member of the U.S. Delegation. The proposal was approved by a vote of 83-0, with Russia and her satellites abstaining.

The election was observed by a United Nations Commission but was confined to South Korea because the puppet communist officials of North Korea refused to let the United Nations Commission travel north of the 38th parallel. More than 95% of the eligible voters of South Korea participated in the election in spite of communist terrorism that left nearly 100 Koreans dead during the election.

The National Assembly of the Democratic Republic of Korea adopted its constitution on July 12, 1948. The constitution promised the Korean people "security, liberty, and happiness" and provided for democratic government. This constitution only affected the two-thirds of the population living south of the 38th parallel. One hundred seats in the legislature of the Republic were left vacant for representatives of the people in Northern Korea. The Republic of Korea was inaugurated August 15, 1948.

Meanwhile, the Soviet controlled North Korean regime announced that a constitution for the "Korean Democratic People's Republic" had been adopted and that elections would be held in August of 1948 to elect representatives. The communist North Korean government pretended to hold a "nation-wide" election with "secret" ballots being cast in South Korea.
The General Assembly in September 1948 recognized the Republic of Korea as the only democratically established government in Korea. The United States and all the major free nations have recognized the Republic. The United States sponsored the admission of the Republic to the United Nations but Soviet Russia vetoed its entrance. (USSR and Ukrainian delegates cast the only opposing votes.)

Withdrawal of United States Forces

Partisan practitioners of hindsight are now claiming that the withdrawal of United States forces from Korea was an unadvised step not advised by American military authorities and should not have been taken. They add that if American forces had been left, the north Korean attack would not have come.

The facts are: The withdrawal was primarily for military reasons and upon the recommendation of military authorities. It was requested by the United Nations. It was made upon the recommendation of and in full consultation with responsible Republican officials. It was made only after General MacArthur had stated that Korean security forces were prepared to take over.

In the first place, the withdrawal of American forces was primarily for military reasons and upon the recommendation of the Defense establishment. American military manpower was severely limited by the rapid demobilization demanded by the people at the end of the war, by the cut in funds available for military purposes made necessary by the Republican-sponsored Revenue tax bill and by the limitations on manpower for American armed forces.

It was therefore necessary for United States military authorities to spread our available manpower thin throughout the many areas of United States world-wide responsibility where potential danger might become real trouble.

Prior to the time the United States took the Korean case to the UN in the Fall of 1947, the responsible authorities in the United States Government considered specifically whether the United States had any strategic reason for retaining forces there.

In light of the facts stated above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated, and the Secretary of Defense informed the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, that the United States had little strategic interest in maintaining the existing troops in Korea. At that time the Joint Chiefs of Staff were General Eisenhower, Admiral Nimitz and General Spaatz of the Air Force. The Secretary of Defense was Mr. Forrestal. They felt that existing shortages of military manpower in many areas of American responsibility throughout the world, made it essential that all available manpower be utilized in accordance with the relative military priorities of such areas.

Because of these military considerations the resolution on Korea submitted to the UN by the United States in October 1947 contained a provision calling for the withdrawal of all occupying forces.


Used with permission from the Harry Truman Presidential Library
The above group met with the President at Blair House at 9:00 PM.

GENERAL VANDENBERG reported that the First Yak plane had been shot down.

THE PRESIDENT remarked that he hoped that it was not the last.

GENERAL VANDENBERG read the text of the orders which had been issued to our Air Forces calling on them to take "aggressive action" against any planes interfering with their mission or operating in a manner unfriendly to the South Korean forces. He indicated, however, that they had been avoiding combat where the direct carrying-out of their mission was not involved.

MR. ACHESON suggested that an all-out order be issued to the Navy and Air Force to waive all restrictions on their operations.
operations in Korea and to offer the fullest possible support to the South Korean forces, attacking tanks, guns, columns, etc., of the North Korean forces in order to give a chance to the South Koreans to reform.

THE PRESIDENT said he approved this.

MR. PAGE inquired whether this meant action only south of the 38th parallel.

MR. ACHESON said this was correct. He was making no suggestion for any action across the line.

GENERAL VAN DER BURG asked whether this meant also that they should not fly over the line.

MR. ACHESON said they should not.

THE PRESIDENT said this was correct; that no action should be taken north of the 38th parallel. He added "not yet".

MR. PAGE said that care should be used to avoid hitting friendly forces.

GENERAL COLLINS agreed but suggested that the orders themselves should not put restrictions on the operation.

MR. ACHESON said that if it was considered useful the orders could add that the purpose which the orders would implement is to support South Korean forces in conformity with the resolution of the Security Council.

MR. ACHESON said that the second point he wished to bring up was that orders should be issued to the Seventh Fleet to prevent an attack on Formosa.

THE PRESIDENT said he agreed.

MR. ACHESON continued that at the same time the National Government of China should be told to desist from operations against the mainland and that the Seventh Fleet should be ordered to see that those operations would cease.

MR. ACHESON said his third point was an increase in the United States military forces in the Philippines and an acceleration
acceleration of aid to the Philippines in order that we might have a firm base there.

THE PRESIDENT said he agreed.

MR. ACHESON said his fourth point was that aid to Indo-
china should be stepped up and that a strong military mission
should be sent.

He suggested that on all these matters if orders were
issued tonight it would be desirable for the President to
make a statement tomorrow. He handed the President a rough
draft of the type of statement which might be issued.

THE PRESIDENT said he would work on the statement
tonight. The President continued that he wished consideration
given to taking Formosa back as part of Japan and putting it
under MacArthur's Command.

MR. ACHESON said that he had considered this move but
had felt that it should be reserved for later and should not
be announced at this time. It required further study.

THE PRESIDENT said that he had a letter from the
Generalissimo about one month (?) ago to the effect that the
Generalissimo might step out of the situation if that would
help. He said this was a private letter and he had kept it
secret. He said that we might want to proceed along those
lines in order to get Chinese forces helping us. He thought
that the Generalissimo might step out if MacArthur were put
in.

MR. ACHESON said that the Generalissimo was unpredictable
and that it was possible that he might resist and "throw the
ball game". He said that it might be well to do this later.

THE PRESIDENT said that was alright. He himself
thought that it was the next step.

MR. JOHNSON said that the proposals made by the
Secretary of State pleased him very much. He thought that
if we held the line as indicated that that was alright.

MR. ACHESON added in regard to the Formosan situation
that he thought it undesirable that we should get mixed up
in the question of the Chinese administration of the Island.
THE PRESIDENT said that we were not going to give the Chinese "a nickel" for any purpose whatever. He said that all the money we had given them is now invested in United States real estate.

MR. JOHNSON added or in banks in the Philippine Islands.

ADMIRAL SHERMAN said that the Command of the Seventh Fleet could be either under Admiral Radford at Pearl Harbor or under General MacArthur. He said that under the orders issued yesterday the Seventh Fleet had been ordered to proceed to Japan and placed under General MacArthur's Command. He said that the orders in regard to Formosa would be issued from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to General MacArthur so to employ the forces allocated by Admiral Radford to General MacArthur.

No objection was raised to this statement.

MR. ACHESON said that the Security Council would meet tomorrow afternoon and that the Department had prepared a further resolution for adoption. Our reports were that we would get full support. He noted that even the Swedes were now supporting us.

MR. HICKERSON read the draft of the Security Council resolution recommending that UN members render such assistance as was needed to Korea to repel the attack.

THE PRESIDENT said that was right. He said we wanted everyone in on this, including Hong Kong.

GENERAL BRADLEY reported that British Air Marshall Tedder had come in to see him, was generally in accord with our taking the firm position, and gave General Bradley a full report of the forces which the British have in that area.

MR. RUSK pointed out that it was possible the Russians would come to the Security Council meeting and cast a veto. In that case we would still take the position that we could act in support of the Charter.

THE PRESIDENT said that was right. He rather wished they would veto. He said we needed to lay a base for our action in Formosa. He said that he would work on the draft of his statement tonight and would talk to the Defense and State Departments in the morning regarding the final text.
MR. RUSK pointed out that it was Mr. Kennan's estimate that Formosa would be the next likely spot for a Communist move.

SECRETARY JOHNSON reported that SCAP's guess was that the next move would be on Iran. He thought there should be a check on this.

GENERAL COLLINS said that SCAP did not have as much global information as they have in Washington. He and Mr. Pace stated that they have asked for full reports all over the world in regard to any developments, particularly of Soviet preparations.

SECRETARY JOHNSON suggested to Mr. Acheson that it would be advisable to have some talks with the UK regarding possible action in Iran.

MR. ACHESON said he would talk with both the British and French.

MR. ACHESON asked Admiral Sherman whether he desired that any action should be taken regarding the utilization of the Sakishimas, south of Okinawa.

ADMIRAL SHERMAN said he would leave this to General MacArthur.

MR. ACHESON said it would be better to put any necessary supporting air forces on these Islands than to try to put them on Formosa itself.

MR. FACE inquired whether the State Department would inform Ambassador Muccio concerning the orders which were being given.

MR. ACHESON said from latest reports it would probably be impossible for us to contact Ambassador Muccio.

GENERAL COLLINS reported that they were in contact with Seoul through a ham radio operator there.

MR. FACE said that they could pass a message to Ambassador Muccio through General MacArthur.

MR. ACHESON suggested that the President might wish to get in Senator Connally and other members of the Senate and House and tell them what had been decided.
THE PRESIDENT said that he had a meeting scheduled for 10:00 tomorrow morning with the Big Four and that he would get in any others that the Secretary thought should be added. He suggested that Secretaries Acheson and Johnson should also be there.

MR. JOHNSON suggested that the majority and minority members of the two Armed Services Committees be included.

After the discussion it was agreed to set the meeting for 11:30.

THE PRESIDENT then read the following list of persons to be included in the meeting:

The Big Four (Luces, Rayburn, McCormack—the Vice President will be out of town), Senators Connally, Wiley, George, Alexander Smith, Thomas of Utah, Tydings and Bridges; Congressmen Kea, Eaton, Vinson and Short.

MR. JOHNSON referred again to the draft statement for the President, said that it was very forthright, that he liked it very much and that the Joint Chiefs would consider it during the evening and make any suggestions in the morning.

GENERAL COLLINS stated that the military situation in Korea was bad. It was impossible to say how much our air can do. The Korean Chief of Staff has no fight left in him.

MR. ACHESON stated that it was important for us to do something even if the effort were not successful.

MR. JOHNSON said that even if we lose Korea this action would save the situation. He said this action "suits me". He then asked whether any of the military representatives had any objection to the course of action which had been outlined. There was no objection.

GENERAL VANDENBERG, in response to a question from Mr. Pinletter, said that he bet a tank would be knocked out before dark.
THE PRESIDENT said he had done everything he could for five years to prevent this kind of situation. How the situation is here and we must do what we can to meet it.

He had been wondering about the mobilization of the National Guard and asked General Bradley if that was necessary now. If it was he must go to Congress and ask for funds. He was merely putting the subject on the table for discussion. He repeated we must do everything we can for the Korean situation - "for the United Nations".

GENERAL BRADLEY said that if we commit our ground forces in Korea we cannot at the same time carry out our other commitments without mobilization. He wondered if it was better to wait now on the question of mobilization of the National Guard. He thought it would be preferable to wait a few days.

THE PRESIDENT said he wished the Joint Chiefs to think about this and to let him know in a few days time. He said "I don't want to go to war".

GENERAL COLLINS stated that if we were going to commit ground forces in Korea we must mobilize.

MR. ACHESON suggested that we should hold mobilization in reserve.

MR. JOHNSON said he hoped these steps already authorized will settle the Korean question.

THE PRESIDENT said the next question would be the mobilization of the Fleet Reserve.

ADmiral sherman said there must be a degree of balance.

THE PRESIDENT noted that there is some pretty good air in the National Guard. He had never been in favor of this and thought it should be like the Naval Reserve.

GENERAL VANDERBROG said he was very glad to hear the President say this.

ADmiral sherman asked whether MacArthur could anchor the fleet in Pormosan ports if necessary.

THE PRESIDENT asked Mr. Acheson what he thought about this.
MR. ACHESON said that they should go ahead and do it.

ADMIRAL SHERMAN said this would be the best procedure.

GENERAL COLLINS remarked that if we had had standing orders we could have stopped this. We must consider this problem for the future.

THE PRESIDENT said he agreed.

MR. JOHNSON said that if there was danger of a Russian veto in the Security Council the President's statement should be put out before the Security Council meets tomorrow.

MR. ACHESON agreed.
Richard Arthur Christopher ("Rich") Hilton was born on May 2, 1933 in Roslyn (Long Island), New York. During the Korean War, Mr. Hilton worked on missile technology due to his proficiency with mathematics. His work with missiles saw him stationed in Albuquerque and White Sands, New Mexico. After his service, Mr. Hilton suffered numerous injuries in a car wreck, which left him blind, without a sense of smell, and lacking many memories of his time in the service. All that said, he is grateful to be alive and proud of his time in the Army.

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Earl A. House was born in Baltimore, Maryland, on August 30, 1931. After leaving high school early and enlisting in the naval reserves, Mr. House decided to enlist in the Army full time at the beginning of the Korean War. After he completed basic training, Mr. House was sent to Korea. The reality of war quickly subdued his initial excitement for fighting in the war. After receiving a shoulder injury, Mr. House drove a truck and Jeep that transported military personnel. He is proud of his service and sees it as stopping the spread of communism.

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The predawn quiet of a rainy, peaceful Sunday morning, June 25, 1950, was abruptly shattered by the crash of cannons and the snarl of automatic weapons as soldiers of North Korea marched southward. The invading hordes breached the 38th parallel and rolled back the lightly-armed Republic of Korea army constabulary forces toward their capital of Seoul.

Two days later, the United Nations called on the countries of the world to unite and assist in driving the invader from the ROK. In its resolution, the UN Security Council named the United States as executive agent to implement the resolution and direct UN military operations in Korea.

President Harry S. Truman, armed with the UN resolution and recognizing a threat to the free world, determined the US could no longer remain neutral while communist powers trampled the free nations of the world.

Douglas MacArthur, [General of the Army and Commander-in-Chief of the] Far East Command, was ordered to provide whatever assistance was needed to repel this invasion. General MacArthur committed US air and naval forces and on July 24, in Tokyo, established General Headquarters, United Nations Command.

**UNITED NATIONS APPEAL**

By then, the UN had issued a further appeal to all member nations to provide what military and other aid they could to assist the ROK government in repelling the invaders. The first ground troops to enter battle on the side of the ROK were advance elements of the US 21st Infantry Regiment, 24th Infantry Division. Units were airlifted from occupation duties in Japan to form "Task Force Smith." The unit was committed on July 5th a few miles north of Osan.

In the face of overpowering enemy strength, the UNC fought delaying actions as ROK and US units withdrew down the peninsula. Outnumbered and out-gunned, they traded space for time as they waited for the pledged assistance from other countries of the UN.

On August 29, 1950, the British Commonwealth's 27th Brigade arrived at Pusan to join the UNC, which until then included only ROK and US forces. The 27th Brigade moved into the Naktong River line west of Taegu.

Troop units from other countries of the UN followed in rapid succession; Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand and Turkey. The Union of South Africa provided air units which fought alongside the air forces of other member nations. Denmark, India, Norway, and Sweden provided medical units. Italy provided a hospital, even though it was not a UN member.

**KEEP THE FREE WORLD FREE**

During the three years of the Korean War, military forces of these nations fought and died together as members of the UNC. They fought for the freedom of the Korean people and to demonstrate UN resolve to stop unprovoked aggression.

Through the freezing winters and the sweltering heat of the Korean summers, men from Britain, Ethiopia, the Republic of Korea, Thailand, Turkey, United States, and other contributing countries demonstrated individual and collective heroism in facing human waves of North Korean and Chinese aggressors. Few battles in the history of modern warfare have wrought the heartbreak and the frustration of this struggle.

Bloody Ridge, Chosin Reservoir, Hamhung, Heartbreak Ridge, Hwachan Reservoir, Iron Triangle, Punch Bowl and Pusan Perimeter—all were mileposts in the seesaw battle for Korea's freedom. The dust of Old Baldy was crimsoned with blood of valiant members of the UNC; the Han and Imjin Rivers ran red with blood of UN fighting men.
On July 27, 1953, the shooting ended. An armistice was signed at Panmunjom which provided for the end of the fighting and eventual political settlement of the war. The shooting ended, but the troops remained, each side pulling back 2,000 meters from the last line of military contact to insure peace, to watch the Demilitarized Zone, and to guard against any resumption of hostilities.

THE PRICE OF FREEDOM

In a green field at Tanggok, located near the port of Pusan, stand myriad reminders of the Korean War. Simple white crosses, standing near the sign of the “Crescent and the Star” and the “Star of David” are bleak, symbolic representatives of the 33,629 Americans, numberless Koreans, 717 Turkish soldiers, and 1,109 soldiers of the United Kingdom who gave their lives during the struggle. Also sharing this place of honor are the symbols for the dead of the 12 other nations whose fighting men died to keep Korea free.

With the coming of the armistice, UNC members turned their attention to the tremendous task of assisting in rebuilding a war-torn economy. Assisting the people of the ROK in restoring and reconstructing a nation almost completely devastated by a war that leveled cities and destroyed farmlands was a gigantic project that was years in the accomplishment.

TROOP STRENGTHS

Peak strength for the UNC was 932,964 on July 27, 1953 — the day the Armistice Agreement was signed:

- Republic of Korea: 590,911
- Colombia: 1,068
- United States: 302,483
- Belgium: 900
- United Kingdom: 14,198
- South Africa: 826
- Canada: 6,146
- The Netherlands: 819
- Turkey: 5,453
- Luxembourg: 44
- Australia: 2,282
- Philippines: 1,496
- New Zealand: 1,385
- Thailand: 1,204
- Ethiopia: 1,271
- Greece: 1,263
- France: 1,119
At the Bipartisan Conference on January 5, 1954, the President made a clear statement of American policy toward Korea, which amounted to a complete backing of the policies announced in recent weeks by himself and Sec. Dulles. He pointed out that the recent announcement in regard to inability to confine hostilities to Korea should the fighting be renewed, was in no sense a criticism of past Administrations but rather a recognition of the new situation which now obtains. He said that the Administration believed, speaking generally, in the doctrine of hot pursuit -- that is, of using our full strength to destroy bases used against us. He commented that we cannot allow Communist insensitivity to keep us deployed too widely.

He indicated that the decision to withdraw divisions from Korea was based on a unanimous JCS decision, and he pointed out that the accomplishment of training of Koreans will result in maintenance of total ground strength at the maximum levels specified by the armistice.

Later in the meeting, he replied to a question by Rep. Vinson by saying that the withdrawal of divisions would have the effect of showing the Communists that we are confident in the strength of our naval and air arms, and that this will have greater impact than any reliance on ground forces of which they are not afraid. Sec. Dulles reinforced this with comment on the possible Communist desire to pull our troops into Asia where they could not be effective in the face of surplus Chinese manpower. Sec. Dulles also commented that President Choue will be less apt to break the truce if the possibility of embroiling the United States is eliminated by the withdrawal of troops.

Still later in the discussion the President expressed his feeling that the withdrawal of troops would not have adverse effect on our Allies since we are making clear that we will fight offensively should a new outbreak occur. He concluded by saying that in the long run it might develop, of course, that Rep. Vinson's approach was right and his own was wrong, but that all the indications are that a new approach has to be tried and he stands ready to modify policy should it become necessary to do so.
Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of Korea

October 1, 1953

The Parties to this Treaty,

Reaffirming their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments, and desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace in the Pacific area, desiring to declare publicly and formally their common determination to defend themselves against external armed attack so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that either of them stands alone in the Pacific area, desiring further to strengthen their efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and security pending the development of a more comprehensive and effective system of regional security in the Pacific area, have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

The Parties undertake to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, or obligations assumed by any Party toward the United Nations.

ARTICLE II

The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of either of them, the political independence or security of either of the Parties is threatened by external armed attack. Separately and jointly, by self help and mutual aid, the Parties will maintain and develop appropriate means to deter armed attack and will take suitable measures in consultation and agreement to implement this Treaty and to further its purposes.

ARTICLE III

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the Parties in territories now under their respective administrative control, or hereafter recognized by one of the Parties as lawfully brought under the administrative control of the other, would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

ARTICLE IV

The Republic of Korea grants, and the United States of America accepts, the right to dispose United States land, air and sea forces in and about the territory of the Republic of Korea as determined by mutual agreement.

ARTICLE V

This Treaty shall be ratified by the United States of America and the Republic of Korea in accordance with their respective constitutional processes and will come into force when instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged by them at Washington.

ARTICLE VI

This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Either Party may terminate it one year after notice has been given to the other Party.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.

DONE in duplicate at Washington, in the English and Korean languages, this first day of October 1953.
[The United States Senate gave its advice and consent to the ratification of the treaty subject to the following understanding:]

It is the understanding of the United States that neither party is obligated, under Article III of the above Treaty, to come to the aid of the other except in case of an external armed attack against such party; nor shall anything in the present Treaty be construed as requiring the United States to give assistance to Korea except in the event of an armed attack against territory which has been recognized by the United States as lawfully brought under the administrative control of the Republic of Korea.

[The United States communicated the text of the understanding to the Republic of Korea in a note of January 28, 1954, acknowledged by the Republic of Korea in a note of February 1, 1954. The text of the understanding was included in the President’s proclamation of November 17, 1954.]

(1) TIAS 3097, 5 UST 23602376. Ratification advised by the Senate Jan. 26, 1954, and ratified by the President Feb. 5, 1954, subject to an understanding; entered into force Nov. 17, 1954.

(2) Ratifications were exchanged Nov. 17, 1954. (3) TIAS 3097.

George H. Campbell enlisted in the Army in 1951 in hopes that he would have more say in his military career than he would have if he had been drafted. After attending the University of Florida for two years, Campbell used medical training he received to become a medical airman in the US Army. Although he was not stationed in Korea during the war, Mr. Campbell became a medical equipment inspector and lived in Korea (Busan) with his family for three years in the early 1970s. He is proud of his service, and looks back at his work as [providing a form of] support to the Republic of Korea.

Source: http://www.kwvdm.org

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### Supporting Question 3

| Featured Source | Source C: Charles Rangel, oral history, Korean War Legacy Project; accessible at https://koreanwarlegacy.org/interviews/congressman-charles-rangel/ |

Charles Rangel was born June 11, 1930 in Harlem, New York. At the age of 17, he enlisted in the military as a way to help support his family. During the Korean War, Mr. Rangel served in the 2nd Infantry Division. He was awarded the Bronze Star and Purple Heart for leading a group of men out of a Chinese encirclement at Kunu Ri. He has famously noted that being injured that day was the worst day of his life, and that he has “never had a bad day since.” Rangel is best known for his post-military career as a US Congressional Representative for the state of New York (1971-2017).

Source: http://www.kwvd.org

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“South Korea is finding, as I have told them, that their talk of appeasement with North Korea will not work, they only understand one thing!’ Mr. Trump said on Twitter. The tone of Mr. Trump’s statements stunned officials here [in Seoul, South Korea] and underscored what unlikely partners he and Mr. Moon are, at a time when their countries’ 67-year-old military alliance faces an ever-more-dangerous regime in Pyongyang. Mr. Moon, who was elected in May promising to seek dialogue with North Korea, fired back at Mr. Trump, insisting that the crisis be resolved peacefully.”